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Abstract
While it is generally acknowledged that fascist movements tend to glorify the national 
past of the country in which they arise, sometimes, fascist regimes seek to resurrect a 
past even more ancient, and more glorious still; the turn towards ancient Greece and 
Rome. This phenomenon is particularly marked in the case of the two most powerful 
and indisputably ‘fascist’ regimes of all: Benito Mussolini’s Italy and Adolf Hitler’s Ger-
many. The author suggests that this twin turn towards antiquity was no mere accident, 
but was rather motivated by certain commonalities in national experience. By placing 
these two fascist regimes alongside each other and considering their seduction by an-
tique myths in tandem, it is argued that – without putting forward some kind of clas-
sicizing Sonderweg – we can better appreciate the historic rootedness of this particular 
form of ‘chronopolitics’ in a complex nexus of political and social causes, many of 
which lie far deeper than the traumatic events of the Great War and its aftermath.
Keywords
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While it is generally acknowledged that fascist movements tend to glorify the 
national past of the country in which they arise, sometimes, fascist regimes 
seek to resurrect a past even more ancient, and more glorious still – a phenom-
enon which has been ascribed to the search for ‘distant models’; the turn to-
wards ancient Greece and Rome. This phenomenon is particularly marked in 
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the case of the two most powerful and indisputably ‘fascist’ regimes of all: 
Benito Mussolini’s Italy and Adolf Hitler’s Germany.1
Previously, the ‘appropriations’ or ‘abuses’ of antiquity perpetrated under 
Fascism and National Socialism have tended to exercise a rather morbid fasci-
nation upon classicists and ancient historians,2 whilst remaining relatively 
overlooked by modern historians and scholars of fascism.3 Indeed, it is only 
relatively recently that the Fascist and National Socialist dictatorships’ re-
course to such ‘distant models’ has begun to receive serious attention in his-
torical scholarship, rather than being dismissed as superficial legitimatory 
window-dressing.4 Even in the wake of the so-called ‘cultural turn’ in fascist 
studies, classicizing ideology and propaganda has all too often been given 
short shrift for being a merely ‘reactionary’ or ‘anti-modern’ element of fas-
cism, rather than constituting a genuinely modernizing impulse.5 Instead, it is 
1 Cf. e.g. Robert O. Paxton, ‘The Five Stages of Fascism,’ The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 1 
(1998): 1–23, and Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 
which characterize Italian Fascism and National Socialism as the only two fascist regimes to 
have endured through all ‘five stages of fascism’, from intellectual exploration to the achieve-
ment of power to eventual radicalization or entropy.
2 For a brilliant and highly convincing analysis of this phenomenon, see Katie Fleming, ‘The 
Use and Abuse of Antiquity: The Politics and Morality of Appropriation,’ in Classics and the 
Uses of Reception, ed. Charles Martindale and Richard F. Thomas (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 
127–137; for an example of it at work in practice, see Michael Biddiss and Maria Wyke, ed., The 
Uses and Abuses of Antiquity (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999).
3 Two classical scholars, Volker Losemann and Mariella Cagnetta, provided the first, undeni-
ably ground-breaking studies of classics and ancient history under the Nazi and Fascist re-
gimes respectively: Volker Losemann, Nationalsozialismus und Antike: Studien zur Entwick-
lung des Faches Alte Geschichte 1933–1945 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1977); Mariella 
Cagnetta, Antichisti e impero fascista (Bari: Dedalo, 1979). The first major edited volume cov-
ering both regimes, Beat Näf, ed., Antike und Altertumswissenschaft in der Zeit von Faschismus 
und Nationalsozialismus (Mandelbachtal: Cicero, 2001), which contained an extensive num-
ber of useful essays, as well as a comprehensive bibliography of relevant items published 
before the turn of the millennium, was also fundamentally an initiative by classical scholars. 
Meanwhile, many of the most seminal histories or handbooks on fascism mention classical 
appropriations barely, if at all: e.g. Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914–1945 (Madison: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995); Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, Future (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Philip Morgan, Fascism in Europe, 1919–1945 (London: 
Routledge, 2003); Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism; and Richard J. B. Bosworth, ed., The Oxford 
Handbook of Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
4 Cf. Joshua Arthurs, Excavating Modernity: The Roman Past in Fascist Italy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2012), 2–5.
5 Cf. e.g. Claudio Fogu, The Historic Imaginary: Politics of History in Fascist Italy (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 2003); for further discussion of this problem see Joshua Arthurs, ‘The 
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treated simply as a more extreme version of that inherent and indiscriminate 
‘passatism’ or longing for palingenesis which besets all fascist regimes in some 
form or another.6 Hence, the shared peculiarities of this particular preference 
for the classical past in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany have rarely been consid-
ered, nor have the deeper roots of this predilection been disinterred systemati-
cally and analyzed comparatively; in general, Mussolinian romanità has 
 received the lion’s share of the scholarly attention.7
In this article, I aim to remedy this state of affairs by putting forward two, 
interconnected, strands of argument. Firstly, I wish to propose that, rather 
than being linked specifically to the dictates of fascist ideology or the traumas 
of the First World War and its aftermath, the twin phenomena of romanità and 
Nazi Hellenophile classicism have equally deep roots in their respective na-
tional cultures; in order to appreciate their significance fully, we need to look 
back far beyond the twentieth century, beyond Italian and German unifica-
tion, and even beyond the Napoleonic Wars. Relatedly, I wish to suggest that 
the similarities between these classicizing phenomena can in part be explained 
by the historical difficulties inherent in constructing stable national identities 
Excavatory Intervention: Archaeology and the Chronopolitics of Roman Antiquity in Fascist 
Italy,’ Journal of Modern European History 13, no. 1 (2015): 44–58, especially pp. 45–47; also 
Roger Griffin, ‘Fascism’s Modernist Revolution: A New Paradigm for the Study of Right-Wing 
Dictatorships,’ Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies 5 (2016): 105–129, especially pp. 
126ff, https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-00502002.
6 See the classic account of fascism as ‘palingenetic ultranationalism’ in Griffin, The Nature of 
Fascism; also Roger Griffin, ‘Fixing Solutions: Fascist Temporalities as Remedies for Liquid 
Modernity,’ Journal of Modern European History 13, no. 1 (2015): 5–23.
7 For recent treatments of romanità by historians, see Emilio Gentile’s comprehensive study of 
Mussolini’s attempt to cast the Italians as the ‘Romans of modernity’, Fascismo di pietra (Bari: 
Laterza, 2007); also Arthurs, Excavating Modernity, and several notable contributions by Ar-
istotle Kallis and Jan Nelis: e.g. Aristotle Kallis, ‘“Framing” Romanità: The Celebrations for the 
Bimillenario Augusteo and the Augusteo-Ara Pacis Project,’ Journal of Contemporary History 
46, no. 4 (2011): 809–831; Aristotle Kallis, The Third Rome, 1922–43: The Making of the Fascist 
Capital (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Jan Nelis, ‘Constructing Fascist Identity: 
Benito Mussolini and the Myth of Romanità,’ Classical World 100, no. 4 (2007): 391–415; Jan 
Nelis, ‘Back to the Future: Italian Fascist Representations of the Roman Past,’ Fascism: Journal 
of Comparative Fascist Studies 3, no. 1 (2014): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-00301001. 
On National Socialism and antiquity, see most recently Johann Chapoutot, Greeks, Romans, 
Germans: How the Nazis Usurped Europe’s Classical Past (Oakland, CA: University of Califor-
nia Press, 2016). Meanwhile, Katie Fleming’s handbook entry, ‘Fascism,’ in A Companion to the 
Classical Tradition, ed. Craig W. Kallendorf (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 342–354, provides an 
extremely concise (yet telling) example of the benefits accrued by examining Fascist and 
National Socialist attitudes to classical antiquity from a comparative perspective.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/09/2020 02:28:54PM
via Durham University
Roche
<UN>
130
fascism 8 (2019) 127-152
in Italy and Germany, due to the long-fractured nature of their polities, and the 
discontents of late unification in both countries.
The intention here is not to put forward some sort of essentializing classical 
Sonderweg, or to peddle simplistic historical parallels, but rather to suggest 
that identification with an idealized and imaginary ancient Greece and Rome 
played an analogous function in helping first to create, and then to strengthen, 
national identities at similar junctures in German and Italian history.8 Nor 
should this be taken to suggest that other aspects of the more straightforward-
ly national past – the Risorgimento, for example, or the exploits of Bismarck 
and the Wars of Unification – were unimportant in Fascist and National Social-
ist myth-making (indeed, it would be perfectly possible to write a history of 
Fascist Italy or of Nazi Germany without mentioning their classicizing 
 predilections at all).9 Nevertheless, this is arguably still an important and 
 deeply-rooted cultural trope which – as recent scholarship has begun to 
 indicate – merits serious investigation in its own right.
In what follows, I shall begin by providing a brief outline of the relevant 
spheres of historiography which have informed this essay’s approach, situating 
my discussion within the current debate on fascist ‘chronopolitics’. I will then 
proceed to delineate the ways in which Mussolini’s ‘Third Rome’ and Hitler’s 
Third Reich variously appropriated and functionalized classical antiquity. Fi-
nally, I will analyze the rootedness of Nazi philhellenism and Fascist romanità 
within their corresponding historical contexts, exploring their respective roles 
in the formation of German and Italian national identities from the mid- 
eighteenth century onwards.
8 The negative Sonderweg thesis sought to locate Germany’s ‘special path’ to modernity, and in 
particular its recourse to Nazism and subsequent genocide, in the failure fully to realize dem-
ocratic impulses prior to unification, especially during the revolutions of 1848; this paradigm 
implicitly (and at times explicitly) contrasted Germany unfavourably with other longer-
standing Western democracies, especially Britain, France and the usa. The argument pre-
sented here, by contrast, does not seek to cast judgment upon German and Italian classiciz-
ing chronopolitics per se; nor does it rule out a further application to many other countries 
whose identities were similarly in a state of flux, albeit for different reasons. Prime examples 
might include not only Metaxas’ Greece, but also the United States (my thanks to Rebecca 
Futo-Kennedy for raising this point).
9 cf. e.g. Albert Russell Ascoli and Krystyna von Henneberg, ed., Making and Remaking Italy: 
The Cultivation of National Identity around the Risorgimento (Oxford: Berg, 2001); Robert Ger-
warth, The Bismarck Myth: Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2005), 128.
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1 Fascist Chronopolitics and the Temporal Turn
As Christian Goeschel has noted, it is now increasingly rare for scholars work-
ing on Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany to engage seriously either with the histo-
riography of the other country in question, or with the more theoretical litera-
ture on generic fascism.10 In this article, I aim not only to engage in a genuinely 
comparative endeavour, but also to draw on – and draw together – a number of 
diverse historiographical strands which, despite the connections which may 
exist between them, rarely interact with one another: namely, scholarship on 
the classical tradition, on fascism, and on Italian and German national identity 
more broadly. That such interactions across historiographies can be extremely 
fruitful may be exemplified by Goeschel’s latest survey of publications which 
consider aspects of Italian and German history from a comparative perspec-
tive; however, there are many fresh insights still to be gained.11
However, the most significant recent historiographical development con-
cerning the argument put forward here is undoubtedly the new interest in 
‘chronopolitics’. Ever since the publication of Reinhard Koselleck’s Futures Past 
in 1979,12 there has arisen a growing fascination with the historical conceptual-
ization of time and temporality – a phenomenon which, in an analogy with the 
‘spatial turn’ of the 1970s and early 1980s, has now been dubbed the ‘temporal 
turn’.13 More recently, the Nazi and Fascist dictatorships’ attitudes towards 
temporality have received sustained analysis in their own right, rather than 
merely benefiting from fleeting observations about fascist tendencies to view 
10 Christian Goeschel, ‘“Italia docet”? The Relationship between Italian Fascism and Nazism 
Revisited,’ European History Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2012): 480–492.
11 Christian Goeschel, ‘A Parallel History? Rethinking the Relationship between Italy and 
Germany, ca. 1860–1945,’ The Journal of Modern History 88, no. 3 (2016): 610–632, provides 
a comprehensive review of recent comparative literature on Italy and Germany. Earlier 
works also include Reinhard Elze and Pierangelo Schiera, ed., Italia e Germania: Immagi-
ni, modelli, miti fra due popoli nell’Ottocento: il Medioevo / Das Mittelalter: Ansichten, Ste-
reotypen und Mythen zweier Völker im neunzehnten Jahrhundert: Deutschland und Italien 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988); Richard Bessel, ed., Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: 
Comparisons and Contrasts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Oliver Janz, 
Pierangelo Schiera, and Hannes Siegrist, ed., Zentralismus und Föderalismus im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert: Deutschland und Italien im Vergleich (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000).
12 Reinhard Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979), newly translated by Keith Tribe as Futures Past: On the 
Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
13 Cf. Christopher Clark, ‘Time of the Nazis: Past and Present in the Third Reich,’ in Obses-
sion der Gegenwart: Zeit im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Alexander C. T. Geppert and Till Kössler 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 156–187.
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the past cyclically, or to efface the enormous expanses of time which lie be-
tween the glories of the historical (or mythical) past and the triumphs of the 
revolutionary present.14 It is in this context that Claudio Fogu has popularized 
the term ‘historic present’ – in a metaphorical rather than a strictly grammati-
cal sense – to describe the Mussolinian temporal Weltanschauung.15 In general 
terms, Nazism and Fascism are portrayed as constructing ‘hybrid’ temporali-
ties, seeking to (re)create a mythical and eternal ‘new era’, in order to obliterate 
all the evils of that historicist temporality so beloved of liberal and Marxist 
modernity.16
While it had previously been a commonplace to assert that fascist move-
ments aimed to attach themselves to any convenient historical myth which 
could provide historical legitimation and continuity in a time of uncertainty, 
rooted in the discontents of rapid modernization and the traumas of the 
world’s greatest hemoclysm to date, recent research on this particular type of 
chronopolitics has also stressed the fundamental importance of ‘[taking] the 
temporal dimension of each fascism’s unique vision of its revolutionary mis-
sion’ seriously.17 Similarly, the editors of a recent special issue of the Journal of 
Modern European History (dedicated exclusively to the topic of ‘fascist tempo-
ralities’) have also argued for the importance of investigating the ‘family re-
semblances’ between Italian Fascism and National Socialism in terms of their 
‘futures past’ – a subject which I explicitly aim to address in this essay.18 From 
this perspective, I also wish to suggest that the distinctions which have of-
ten been proposed between Nazi and Fascist chronopolitics, which generally 
 represent the National Socialist variant as simply embodying what  Christopher 
14 E.g. Fogu, The Historic Imaginary; Claudia Lazzaro and Roger J. Crum, ed., Donatello 
among the Blackshirts: History and Modernity in the Visual Culture of Fascist Italy (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Roger Griffin, ‘“I am no Longer Human. I am a Titan. 
A God!” The Fascist Quest to Regenerate Time,’ in A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Grif-
fin, ed. Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3–23; Kallis, ‘“Fram-
ing” Romanità,’ 823ff. For an example of the more superficial type of engagement, see 
Peter Davies and Derek Lynch, The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 121.
15 Fogu, The Historic Imaginary; also Claudio Fogu, ‘To Make History Present,’ in Donatello 
among the Blackshirts: History and Modernity in the Visual Culture of Fascist Italy, ed. Clau-
dia Lazzaro and Roger J. Crum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 33–49.
16 Fernando Esposito and Sven Reichardt, ‘Revolution and Eternity: Introductory Remarks 
on Fascist Temporalities,’ Journal of Modern European History 13, no. 1 (2015): 20–43, esp. 
pp. 40–42; Arthurs, ‘The Excavatory Intervention’; also more broadly Fernando Esposito, 
Mythische Moderne: Aviatik, Faschismus und die Sehnsucht nach Ordnung in Deutschland 
und Italien (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011).
17 Griffin, ‘Fixing Solutions,’ 21.
18 Cf. Esposito and Reichardt, ‘Revolution and Eternity,’ 25.
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Clark has termed an ‘ahistorical, racial continuum-time’,19 and which focus on 
the racialized aspect of Nazi temporality to the exclusion of all else, still tend 
to ascribe too great a degree of ‘primitivism’ or indiscriminate eclecticism to 
the Third Reich’s temporal politics.20 Hence, it seems crucial not only to ‘place 
the fascist politics of time within a context that extends back at least to the 
early pivotal years of high modernism, the 1880s and 1890s’ (as Fernando Es-
posito and Sven Reichardt have suggested),21 but also to appreciate the degree 
to which the Nazi racial mythicization of antiquity merely represented a trans-
formation of previous cultural trends which had been present in a less virulent 
and Aryanizing form not just for decades, but even for centuries, beforehand.
In effect, the recourse to classicizing ‘distant models’ in both the Italian and 
the German case reflects the fact that both of the antique myths in question 
represented the culmination or radicalization of pre-existing and venerable 
national traditions. Indeed, this should scarcely surprise, given the paramount 
importance of cultural heritage in shaping nationalism, of which fascism gen-
erally constitutes an extreme and distorted, yet recognizable, form.22 Fascism 
appropriates the ideas and traditions which it finds ready to hand in the na-
tionalist canon, creating a kind of ‘fascist national vernacular’ – a phenome-
non which one might usefully compare with the nationally distinct, yet stylisti-
cally related, manifestations of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
romantic nationalism found in figurative art or classical music. Nor, given the 
salience of classical antiquity in providing states with a uniquely authoritative 
and ‘usable’ national past, offering a symbolic repertoire of exceptional power 
and flexibility (particularly when it comes to the justification of  revolution or 
the construction of empire), should it be surprising that two such  self-avowedly 
imperialist dictatorships should find classical models so attractive.23
19 Clark, ‘Time of the Nazis,’ 186.
20 Arthurs, ‘The Excavatory Intervention,’ 47; cf. Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The 
Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
257. Further examples of this tendency include Fogu, The Historic Imaginary; Griffin, ‘Fix-
ing Solutions,’ 15; the phenomenon is also discernible in Chapoutot, Greeks, Romans, 
Germans.
21 Esposito and Reichardt, ‘Revolution and Eternity,’ 26.
22 Cf. e.g. A. D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 71, 84; Aris-
totle Kallis, ‘The “Regime-Model” of Fascism: A Typology,’ European History Quarterly 30, 
no. 1 (2000), 77–104.
23 Cf. e.g. Susan A. Stephens and Phiroze Vasunia, ed., Classics and National Cultures (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Jonathan Sachs, Romantic Antiquity: Rome in the Brit-
ish Imagination, 1789–1832 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20–21; Andrea Giardina 
and André Vauchez, Il mito di Roma da Carlo Magno a Mussolini (Bari: Laterza, 2000), 126.
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In order to pursue these connections further, I shall begin by delineating the 
relationship between Italian Fascism and the ancient Roman past – otherwise 
known as romanità – before moving on to examine the relationship between 
Nazism and classical antiquity.
2 Mussolini, Fascism and the Myth of Rome
Despite Mussolini’s earlier antipathy to the very idea of Rome as Italy’s  capital – 
he notoriously thought the city a squalid metropolis, fit only for ‘shoeshine 
boys and prostitutes’ – it was later claimed (not least by his mistress and biog-
rapher Margherita Sarfatti) that he had idolized ancient Rome since his boy-
hood.24 It is generally supposed that the ‘myth of Rome’ provided Mussolini 
with an establishment-friendly means of cementing Fascist power, whilst si-
multaneously removing propagandistic autonomy from his rebellious ras 
[squad leaders], who still regarded ‘porca Roma’ as an ill-fated haunt of anti-
Fascist reaction, and would far rather have transferred the seat of Fascist gov-
ernment to Milan.25 In the words of Emilio Gentile, it was at this point that ‘the 
lictorial fasces became the symbol of the Fascist party’s ambition to gain a mo-
nopoly on political power and on its identification with the nation.’26 Certain-
ly, Jan Nelis’s comprehensive analysis of Mussolini’s writings on the theme 
demonstrates that, following the end of the First World War, ancient Rome was 
to become a constantly recurring exemplar in the Duce’s thought – not least in 
terms of race (‘The Romans of antiquity were incredible racists’) and the pur-
suit of power in the Mediterranean.27
Once Fascism had gained power, the glorification of ancient Rome was rare-
ly absent from Mussolini’s rhetoric – or from his far-reaching plans for the Fas-
cist future. This glorification took many forms – from the declaration of Rome’s 
‘birthday’ as a national holiday (replacing the socialist May Day celebrations) 
to the pronouncement of a resurrection of the Roman Empire on Rome’s ‘fatal 
hills’ following Italy’s victorious colonial exploits in Ethiopia.28 However, as far 
24 Giardina, Il mito di Roma, 212–213; Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 31, 57–60.
25 Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 53, 66–68. On modern anti-Romanism more generally, see 
Joshua Arthurs, ‘The Eternal Parasite: Anti-Romanism in Italian Politics and Culture since 
1860,’ Annali d’Italianistica 28 (2010), 117–136.
26 Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 63.
27 Nelis, ‘Constructing Fascist Identity,’ 400–401.
28 Cf. Luisa Quartermaine, ‘“Slouching Towards Rome”: Mussolini’s Imperial Vision,’ in Ur-
ban Society in Roman Italy, ed. T. J. Cornell and Kathryn Lomas (London: Routledge, 1995), 
203–215. Epic films set in the ancient Roman past, such as Scipione l’Africano (1937), 
also provided a more popular form of propagandistic legitimation for such classicizing 
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as the Duce himself was concerned, it manifested itself most particularly in 
two ways. Firstly, the salvific qualities and, increasingly, the statuesque gravitas 
of a Roman emperor were ascribed to Mussolini; secondly, at his behest, the 
archaeological and architectural fabric of the city of Rome was utterly 
 transformed – like Augustus himself, Rome’s twentieth-century ‘Dux’ wished 
to transfigure the city which he had triumphantly conquered from prosaic 
stone to magnificent marble.
While contemptuous foreigners and anti-Fascists might dismiss the Duce as 
a mere ‘sawdust Caesar’ whose antique pretensions deserved only ridicule, 
Mussolini himself took such comparisons with the utmost seriousness.29 He 
was said to keep a bust of Julius Caesar on his desk, lionizing him as ‘the great-
est of all men who have ever lived’ (or, depending on his interlocutor, the 
 greatest after Jesus Christ).30 Yet, given the short-lived nature of Caesar’s rule, 
and his violent and brutal death at the hands of conspirators, this model was 
bound to be superseded once the ‘new Rubicon’ of the March on Rome had 
been left behind. Especially once the perquisites of empire seemed to be with-
in his grasp, the ascension of Octavian and his transformation into Augustus 
Caesar seemed to provide a more fitting model for Mussolini’s own ambi-
tions.31 For the ‘Dux’, the fall of the Roman Empire had apparently only been 
temporary, as pictures of him posing magisterially on horseback in Tripoli – ac-
companied by literal Libyan ‘lictors’ in antique costume, bearing ‘authentic’ 
reproduction fasces – were clearly intended to imply.32
Even Augustus’ subsequent deification seemed to find its mirror in those 
propaganda images of Mussolini which portrayed him as more statuesque and 
parallels. See further Arthur J. Pomeroy, ‘Classical Antiquity, Cinema and Propaganda,’ in 
Brill’s Companion to the Classics, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, ed. Helen Roche and 
Kyriakos Demetriou (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 264–285.
29 George Seldes, Sawdust Caesar: The Untold History of Mussolini and Fascism (New York: 
Harper, 1935); cf. Maria Wyke, ‘Sawdust Caesar: Mussolini, Julius Caesar, and the Drama of 
Dictatorship,’ in The Uses and Abuses of Antiquity, ed. Michael Biddiss and Maria Wyke 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), 167–186.
30 Wyke, ‘Sawdust Caesar,’ 169; Alexander Demandt, ‘Klassik als Klischee: Hitler und die An-
tike,’ Historische Zeitschrift 274 (2002): 281–313; here, p. 285.
31 Ann Thomas Wilkins, ‘Augustus, Mussolini, and the Parallel Imagery of Empire,’ in Do-
natello among the Blackshirts: History and Modernity in the Visual Culture of Fascist Italy, 
ed. Claudia Lazzaro and Roger J. Crum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 53–65; 
cf. Fleming, ‘Fascism,’ 344–345.
32 Gerald Silk, ‘“Il Primo Pilota”: Mussolini, Fascist Aeronautical Symbolism, and Imperial 
Rome,’ in Donatello among the Blackshirts: History and Modernity in the Visual Culture of 
Fascist Italy, ed. Claudia Lazzaro and Roger J. Crum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2005), 67–81, esp. pp. 79–80.
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godlike than merely human (the dictator was known to practise what he con-
sidered to be suitably ‘Roman’ martial poses – chin jutting forward, back ram-
rod straight – in order to facilitate the creation of such iconography).33 Indeed, 
Mussolini risked becoming ever more enthralled with his own myth and ap-
parent apotheosis, not only adapting Augustus’ own bons mots for his own 
ends, but also buying into the flood of hagiographic encomia which claimed 
that he had equalled or bettered not only Julius Caesar and Augustus, but also 
Tiberius, Claudius, Nero, Trajan, and all the rest.34 It was no coincidence that, 
after the Duce had been deposed, popular graffiti mocked both his Roman pre-
tensions and his headlong fall from pseudo-divine grace: ‘Voleva essere Cesare, 
morì Vespasiano’ [‘He wanted to be Caesar, but died Vespasian’].35
Yet it was Mussolini’s Augustan attitude to the physical fabric of Rome 
which has left behind the most telltale traces of Fascism in present-day Italy. 
The Duce’s personal interest in Roman archaeology, and his desire to efface the 
remnants of the ‘backward’ medieval, baroque and Renaissance past, led to the 
literal ‘disembowelling’ of the city in order to ‘liberate’ ancient Roman monu-
ments, whilst modern new thoroughfares and classicizing architectural 
 settings were simultaneously constructed in order to showcase them appropri-
ately.36 The most famous of these endeavours include the restoration of the 
Ara Pacis and the transformation of the Circus Maximus, as well as the cre-
ation of the Foro Mussolini (now Foro Italico) and the Via dell’Impero.37
The culmination of these grandiose programmes for remaking Rome’s ur-
ban space can still be seen today, in the form of the buildings on the intended 
33 Silk, ‘“Il Primo Pilota”’; Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 133, 221.
34 Giardina, Il mito di Roma, 253; Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 137.
35 Giardina, Il mito di Roma, 274; Joshua Arthurs, ‘“Voleva essere Cesare, morì Vespasiano”: 
The Afterlives of Mussolini’s Rome,’ Civiltà Romana: Rivista pluridisciplinare di studi su 
Roma antica e le sue interpretazioni 1 (2015): 283–302. As Arthurs points out (page 286), 
this was ‘a double insult, since not only was Vespasian a lesser emperor, but vespasiano is 
[also] slang for “urinal”.’
36 Cf. Borden W. Painter, Mussolini’s Rome: Rebuilding the Eternal City (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005); John A. Agnew, ‘“Ghosts of Rome”: The Haunting of Fascist Efforts at 
Remaking Rome as Italy’s Capital City,’ Annali d’Italianistica 28 (2010): 179–198; Paul Baxa, 
Roads and Ruins: The Symbolic Landscape of Fascist Rome (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010); Aristotle Kallis, ‘The “Third Rome” of Fascism: Demolitions and the Search 
for a New Urban Syntax,’ The Journal of Modern History 84, no. 1 (2012): 40–79; Kallis, The 
Third Rome.
37 Cf. P. Aicher, ‘Mussolini’s Forum and the Myth of Augustan Rome,’ The Classical Bulletin 
76 (2000): 117–139; Aristotle Kallis, ‘The Factory of Illusions in the “Third Rome”: Circus 
Maximus as a Space of Fascist Simulation,’ Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies 
3 (2014): 20–45, https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-00301002; Kallis, ‘“Framing” Romanità.’
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site of the eur/E42 global exhibition ground – including the monumental 
stripped classicism of the ‘quadratic coliseum’ which was to serve as the Fascist 
‘Palace of Roman Civilization’. Linking the Fascist Empire’s future maritime 
base at Ostia and the heart of the ancient city, the exhibition village also pro-
vided the perfect showcase for the grandeur that would be the new Rome. Al-
though many of the quarter’s planned buildings were never completed, the 
area nevertheless remains a forceful monument to the regime’s classicizing 
vision.38
Yet, as Joshua Arthurs has rightly emphasized, it was not Mussolini alone 
who propagated the myth of Fascism’s freshly-recreated and eternal Rome. 
Countless scholars, teachers, architects, artists, archaeologists and intellectu-
als of all stripes responded to the Duce’s antique vision, building a consensus 
‘from below’, and lending credence, expression and propagandistic power to 
the cult of romanità. Despite the fact that Roman images dominated the  Fascist 
visual imaginary, from the fasces and the Roman she-wolf to the eagle-topped 
battle-standards and the ubiquitous legend spqr, the pursuit of romanità was 
by no means a mere ‘directive issued by a totalitarian monolithic state’. Rather, 
it was the product of ‘complex negotiations . . . between the regime and the 
academy . . . and between intellectual currents that ranged from anticlerical-
ism to Catholicism, modernism to historicism, nationalism, and universalism.’39
To take just one example of this phenomenon, which has only recently been 
brought to light by the pioneering work of Han Lamers and Bettina Reitz-
Joosse, the Fascist accession to power heralded an unprecedented explosion of 
Latin-language literature, ‘ranging from lyric odes in praise of Mussolini to 
prose orations extolling the new regime, from epics on Italy’s martial exploits 
in Africa to Latin inscriptions on monuments old and new.’40 Of course, some 
of these efforts were promoted officially, such as school texts, the Fascist teach-
er association anif’s ‘Concorso Dux’ competition for the best Latin poem in 
honour of Mussolini, or the Codex Fori Mussolini, a messianic depiction of 
 Fascist history which, painstakingly copied onto parchment, had been buried 
38 Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 183–195.
39 Arthurs, Excavating Modernity, 6; Marla Stone, ‘A Flexible Rome: Fascism and the Cult of 
Romanità,’ in Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture, 1789–1945, ed. 
Catharine Edwards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 205–220; See also 
Romke Visser, ‘Fascist Doctrine and the Cult of the Romanità,’ Journal of Contemporary 
History 27, no. 1 (1992): 5–22; and Andrea Giardina, ‘The Fascist Myth of Romanity,’ Estu-
dos Avançados 22 (2008): 55–76, esp. p. 73.
40 Han Lamers and Bettina Reitz-Joosse, ‘Lingua Lictoria: The Latin Literature of Italian Fas-
cism,’ Classical Receptions Journal 8, no. 2 (2016): 216–252, quotation from p. 217.
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under a marble obelisk in the Foro Mussolini in order to astonish future gen-
erations thousands of years hence.41
However, other manifestations of this new fervour for Latinitas simply rep-
resented the unforced efforts of individual schoolteachers, intellectuals and 
academics who were keen to present Latin as ‘the perfect expression of the 
new spirit of Italian Fascism’.42 Similar collaborations also characterized the 
gargantuan Mostra Augustea della Romanità [Augustan Exhibition of Ro-
manità] celebrating the emperor’s bimillenary, which represented a concerted 
attempt to assimilate the Age of Augustus and the Age of Mussolini in the eyes 
of the public, yet which was also the product of enthusiastic cooperation be-
tween scholars and museum staff, as well as government officials.43 And, while 
more populist manifestations of romanità – advertisements for viscose star-
ring the Dea Roma, or modern mosaics featuring tennis-players or lorries of 
club-bearing squadristi – might seem to us the height of kitsch, they were 
clearly seen at the time as effective ways of ‘marketing’ the idea of Fascist 
Rome’s antique modernity to the Italian populace at large.44
The effectiveness of all this may at least partially be suggested by the popu-
larity of Romanizing names such as Romano, Romolo, Remo, and Littorio (or 
even Natale Romano!) in christening records during this period.45 Meanwhile, 
purists might decry the classicizing tat that decorated local Fascist headquar-
ters, including ‘incredible painted wall decorations, horrible tinted-chalk busts 
in every corner […and] gilt stucco lictor’s fasces that look to be bundles of kin-
dling’, or curse the Fascistizing flood of knick-knacks and bric-a-brac in the 
form of fasces-shaped lamps, desk accessories, jewellery, and children’s toys – 
yet all of these were clearly popular in their day.46
All in all, ancient Rome seemed to provide a perfect – and infinitely 
‘ flexible’ – paradigm for Fascist dominion and conquest, as well as for the re-
41 Cf. Han Lamers and Bettina Reitz-Joosse, The Codex Fori Mussolini: A Latin Text of Italian 
Fascism (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016).
42 Lamers and Reitz-Joosse, ‘Lingua Lictoria’, esp. p. 232.
43 Cf. Arthurs, Excavating Modernity, Ch. 4. Collaboration of a similar kind also occurred in 
the state-sponsored Istituto dei Studi Romani (Ibid., Ch. 2).
44 See the illustrations in Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 102, facing page 183, and in Lazzaro and 
Crum, Donatello among the Blackshirts, 19.
45 Giardina, Il mito di Roma, 240.
46 Claudia Lazzaro, ‘Forging a Visible Fascist Nation: Strategies for Fusing Past and Present,’ 
in Donatello among the Blackshirts: History and Modernity in the Visual Culture of Fascist 
Italy, ed. Claudia Lazzaro and Roger J. Crum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 
13–31, p. 16; the quotation is taken from Giuseppe Bottai’s comments in the 15 February 
1927 edition of Critica Fascista, translated in Jeffrey T. Schnapp, ed., A Primer of Italian 
Fascism (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 235.
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gime’s internal political order.47 Whether it was being used to validate ‘back-to-
nature’ nostalgic ruralism and land reclamation projects, to promote ‘Roman 
virtues’ such as strength, courage and martial prowess,48 to justify the decon-
struction and reconstruction of the architectural fabric of Italian cities,49 or 
simply to furnish the Fascist hierarchy with a sufficiently symbolic and impos-
ing repertoire of images and political vocabulary, the myth of Rome seemed to 
have become ‘perhaps the most pervasive . . . belief in Fascism’s entire sym-
bolic universe’.50 It was not for nothing that, in a speech proclaimed shortly 
prior to the March on Rome, Mussolini had proclaimed ‘Civis Romanus sum’.51
3 Hitler, Nazism and Antiquity
For Hitler, no less than for Mussolini, Roman history provided an ideal Lehr-
meisterin der Zukunft, an eternal blueprint for securing and immortalizing im-
perial dominion – a fact which undoubtedly had a considerable impact on the 
Führer’s own self-conception, both as an architect and as a military command-
er.52 To Hitler’s mind, Rome represented the perfect paradigm for acquiring 
and securing the modern trappings and infrastructure of imperial power – 
 untiring legions, colonial Autobahns as straight and efficiently-designed for 
military transport as any Roman road, and monumental architecture on a scale 
that was deliberately intended to dwarf Mussolini’s puny efforts.53
47 Cf. Stone, ‘A Flexible Rome.’
48 Giardina, ‘The Fascist Myth of Romanity.’
49 Cf. e.g. Ray Laurence, ‘Tourism, Town Planning and Romanitas: Rimini’s Roman Heritage,’ 
in The Uses and Abuses of Antiquity, ed. Michael Biddiss and Maria Wyke (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 1999), 187–205.
50 Emilio Gentile, ‘Fascism as Political Religion,’ Journal of Contemporary History 25, no. 2/3 
(1990): 229–251; here, p. 244.
51 Il Popolo d’Italia, 21 April 1922, in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, vol. 18, ed. E. and D. 
Susmel (Florence: La Fenice, 1956), 160–161.
52 Chapoutot, Greeks, Romans, Germans, 230; cf. Volker Losemann, ‘The Nazi Concept of 
Rome,’ in Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture, 1789–1945, ed. Catha-
rine Edwards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 221–235; John T. Quinn, 
‘The Ancient Rome of Adolf Hitler,’ The Classical Bulletin, 76 (2000), 141–156. On Hitler’s 
attitude to antiquity in general, see also Pierre Villard, ‘Antiquité et Weltanschauung Hit-
lérienne,’ Revue d’Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale 88 (1972): 1–18; Demandt, ‘Klas-
sik als Klischee.’
53 On the competition between Hitler and Mussolini over classicizing architecture, see e.g. 
Kallis, ‘“Framing” Romanità,’ 828–829; also Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 147; Kallis, The 
Third Rome, 13; Chapoutot, Greeks, Romans, Germans, 73–76, 364; Moritz Föllmer, ‘Ein 
Leben wie im Traum’: Kultur im Dritten Reich (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016), 134, 146–147.
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Yet, when it came to finding a fitting paradigm for the ‘anthropological revo-
lution’ which the Führer envisioned, ultimately, the ‘Greeks of modernity’ ap-
peared more apposite than the Duce’s latter-day ancient Romans. When 
searching for a model for artistic, cultural and social life, or even for long-term 
colonisation, it was to the ancient Greek world – and not least to the martial 
simplicity of Lacedaemon – that Hitler and many of his hierarchs turned with 
most fervour. Once imperium had been obtained with Roman legionary preci-
sion, the Spartiate-helot dynamic still remained the favoured ideal for National 
Socialist dominion over the conquered Eastern territories of the ‘Thousand-
Year Reich’.54
Certainly, in the regime’s highest echelons, very few apart from Himmler 
were interested in glorifying the exploits of the ancient Germans – not least 
given Hitler’s obvious contempt for their cultural ‘achievements’. As the Führer 
allegedly pointed out with irritation when Himmler’s obsession with resurrect-
ing the culture of the ancient Germanic tribes became too prominent, the 
Athenians had built the Parthenon at a time when Germanic tribesmen were 
still stuck in mud huts; hence, ‘if anyone asks us about our ancestors, we should 
continually allude to the ancient Greeks.’55 Meanwhile, in no less influential a 
work than Mein Kampf, Hitler claimed that the struggle for supremacy which 
Germany was currently waging ‘unites the millennia, and embraces both 
Griechentum and Germanentum together.’56 It was not for nothing that one of 
the most prominent floats in the processions celebrating ‘2,000 years of Ger-
manic culture’ at the Tage der deutschen Kunst in Munich boasted a gigantic 
bust of the ancient goddess Athena, accompanied by acolytes in pseudo-Greek 
robes.57 In the National Socialist worldview, the ancient Greek and the Ger-
manic were often inextricably intertwined.
Hence, the National Socialist ‘new man’ generally took the form of a young 
Greek Adonis, as petrifically personified in the heroic neo-Grec nudes of an 
Arno Breker or a Josef Thorak; he was to undergo an ideal ‘paideia’ in the new 
Nazi ‘gymnasion’, which would provide him with a genuine fusion of physical 
54 Ben Kiernan, ‘Hitler, Pol Pot, and Hutu Power: Distinguishing Themes in Genocidal Ideol-
ogy,’ The Holocaust and the United Nations Outreach Programme Discussion Papers Journal 
(2009), 19–31, pp. 22–23.
55 Werner Jochmann, Adolf Hitler: Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944 (Hamburg: 
Knaus, 1980), 214.
56 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich: Zentralverlag der nsdap, 1943), 470.
57 Föllmer, ‘Ein Leben wie im Traum,’ 112–116; cf. Stefan Schweizer, ‘Unserer Weltanschauung 
sichtbaren Ausdruck geben’: Nationalsozialistische Geschichtsbilder in historischen Festzü-
gen zum ‘Tag der deutschen Kunst’ (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), 143–144.
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and intellectual education, just as in ancient Greece;58 and he would reach the 
acme of attainment whilst competing in a new Olympic Games, whose tangi-
ble connections with the glories of ancient Olympia made manifest that con-
sanguinary destiny which inexorably linked the present-day Germans with the 
ancient Greeks.59 Indeed, when the German invasion of modern Greece began 
in April 1941, the Wehrmacht were encouraged to perceive the campaign as a 
mere ‘return’ to safeguard their own ‘ancestral’ land – an age-old belief in a 
mystical Greco-German kinship was forged anew in the fires of chauvinism 
and racial determinism, so that the spirit of that greatest of philhellenes, Jo-
hann Joachim Winckelmann, was even enlisted as the campaign’s spiritual 
patron.60
Yet the Greek city-state which functioned most superbly as an avatar for the 
Third Reich’s own aspirations ultimately had to be Sparta.61 It was not only that 
Hitler’s Schwärmerei for Sparta had always been particularly pronounced – for 
58 Helen Roche, ‘“Anti-Enlightenment”: National Socialist Educators’ Troubled Relationship 
with Humanism and the Philhellenist Tradition,’ Publications of the English Goethe Society 
82, no. 3 (2013): 193–207.
59 Klaus Wolbert, Die Nackten und die Toten des ‘Dritten Reiches’: Folgen einer politischen Ge-
schichte des Körpers in der Plastik des deutschen Faschismus (Gießen: Anabas, 1982); Dan-
iel Wildmann, Begehrte Körper: Konstruktion und Inszenierung des ‘arischen’ Männerkör-
pers im ‘Dritten Reich’ (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998); Ingomar Weiler, ‘Zur 
Rezeption des griechischen Sports im Nationalsozialismus: Kontinuität oder Diskontinu-
ität in der deutschen Ideengeschichte?’ in Antike und Altertumswissenschaft in der Zeit 
von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus, ed. Beat Näf (Mandelbachtal: Cicero, 2001), 
267–284.
60 Esther Sophia Sünderhauf, Griechensehnsucht und Kulturkritik: Die deutsche Rezeption 
von Winckelmanns Antikenideal 1840–1945 (Berlin: Akademie, 2004), 344–352; cf. Christo-
pher Meid, Griechenland-Imaginationen: Reiseberichte im 20. Jahrhundert von Gerhart 
Hauptmann bis Wolfgang Koeppen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), ch. iii.3.
61 Cf. Helen Roche, ‘“In Sparta fühlte ich mich wie in einer deutschen Stadt” (Goebbels): The 
Leaders of the Third Reich and the Spartan Nationalist Paradigm,’ in English and German 
Nationalist and Anti-Semitic Discourse, 1871–1945, ed. Felicity Rash, Geraldine Horan, and 
Daniel Wildmann (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2013), 91–115; also Elizabeth Rawson, The Spartan 
Tradition in European Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 342; Volker Losemann, 
‘Sparta in the Third Reich,’ in The Contribution of Ancient Sparta to Political Thought and 
Practice, ed. Nikos Birgalias, Kostas Buraselis and Paul Cartledge (Athens: Alexandria Pub-
lications, 2007), 449–463; Volker Losemann, ‘The Spartan Tradition in Germany, 1870–
1945,’ in Sparta in Modern Thought: Politics, History and Culture, ed. Stephen Hodkinson 
and Ian Macgregor Morris (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2012), 253–314; Chapoutot, 
Greeks, Romans, Germans, 214–228.
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the Führer, she would always remain the ‘purest racial state in history’.62 Rath-
er, there was much in Spartan history itself – the gruelling, warriorly training of 
the state’s youth; the putative eugenic policies; the obsession with heroic 
death, as embodied by King Leonidas and the three hundred – which seemed 
uncannily to mirror the Nazi state’s deepest aspirations.
Many outside observers – from France to Britain to Soviet Russia – 
 commented on the eerie similarities which they discerned between Sparta and 
the Third Reich, and not only because they had been convinced (or bamboo-
zled) by the regime’s own rhetoric.63 Unsurprisingly, all of these correspon-
dences were exploited a thousand-fold by the Nazi leaders themselves, some of 
whom even made private pilgrimages to Sparta. Thus Goebbels declared, when 
he visited Sparta in 1936, that he felt ‘just as if he were in a German city’,64 while 
Education Minister Bernhard Rust was often to be heard proclaiming omi-
nously (and with great emphasis) that the Third Reich must ‘rear a race of 
Spartans, and any who are unwilling to espouse this Spartiate community must 
relinquish forever their claim to be citizens of our state.’65 Indeed, Reich 
 Agriculture Minister Richard Walther Darré was so impressed with the 
 Lacedaemonian example that, in 1933, he drew up a new entailed-estate law 
based  explicitly on Spartan legislation.66 Meanwhile, as World War ii pro-
gressed, it became impossible to avoid the grotesque characterization of the 
German forces’ catastrophic encirclement at Stalingrad as a modern Battle of 
62 Speech at the nsdap party conference, 8 August 1929, cited in Klaus Lankheit, ed., Hitler: 
Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen, Band iii Teil 2 (Munich: Saur, 1994), 348; cf. Adolf Hitler, 
Hitlers Zweites Buch (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), 56–57.
63 Cf. e.g. Henri Lichtenberger, L’Allemagne nouvelle (Paris: Flammarion, 1936), ch. 5; Ste-
phen Hodkinson, ‘Sparta and Nazi Germany in mid-20th-century British Liberal and Left-
Wing Thought,’ in Sparta: The Body Politic, ed. Anton Powell and Stephen Hodkinson 
(Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2010), 297–342; Losemann, ‘Spartan Tradition,’ 284.
64 Athenian Embassy Report, 30 September 1936, quoted in Hagen Fleischer, ‘Die “Viehmen-
schen” und das “Sauvolk”: Feindbilder einer dreifachen Okkupation: Der Fall Griechen-
land,’ in Kultur – Propaganda – Öffentlichkeit: Intentionen deutscher Besatzungspolitik und 
Reaktionen auf die Okkupation, ed. Wolfgang Benz and Gerhard Otto (Berlin: Metropol, 
1998), 135–169, p. 135; cf. Goebbels’ diary entry from 26 September 1936 in Elke Fröhlich, 
ed., Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil I, Band 3/ii (Munich: Saur, 2001), 194: ‘Noth-
ing from antiquity remains to be seen . . . but just to know the place where Sparta once lay 
is thrilling.’
65 Bernhard Rust, ‘Rede des Preuß. Kultusministers Rust bei der Einweihung der landgebun-
denen Hochschule für Lehrerbildung in Lauenburg (Pommern) am 24. Juni 1933,’ in 
Deutsche Erziehung im neuen Staat, ed. Friedrich Hiller (Langensalza: Julius Beltz, 1935), 
45 (both types of emphasis are in the original).
66 Volker Losemann, ‘“Ein Staatsgedanke aus Blut und Boden”: R.W. Darré und die Agrarge-
schichte Spartas,’ Laverna 16 (2005): 67–120.
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 Thermopylae – a propaganda conceit orchestrated by Goebbels, and per-
formed on air with the utmost verve by Goering, Hitler’s heftiest henchman, in 
his Appell an die Wehrmacht (30 January 1943).67
Once again, one did not have to look far to find enthusiastic appropriation 
of these ideas by academics, teachers, students, artists and intellectuals, as well 
as the commercial endorsement of such Spartan aspirations by firms market-
ing new products such as ‘Sparta-Crème’ (a brand of sun cream distributed by 
a well-known eau de cologne manufacturer).68 Moreover, one certainly did not 
have to believe (as Hitler apparently did) that the Spartans were indubitably 
blood-relatives of the simple peasants of Schleswig-Holstein, due to their 
shared predilection for ‘black broth’, in order to hail the Third Reich as a totali-
tarian Sparta rediviva.69 Indeed, it was under just such a rubric that the mem-
bers of the White Rose resistance group castigated the regime in one of their 
leaflets, before their activities were brought abruptly to a cruel and untimely 
close.70
Of course, none of this is to say that the German past was considered unim-
portant under Nazism, or to deny that models from other nations and cultures, 
such as the British Empire, the United States or Japan, had an important role to 
play.71 Nor is it to suggest that this ‘philhellenism in a new key’ was expressed 
in anything other than an Aryanizing mode, conditioned by racist assump-
tions.72 However, it does seem that there is more at stake here than a simple 
mythicizing ‘Aryanization’ of the entirety of Greco-Roman history, without 
precedent or preference.73 Rather, where the history of the ancient world had 
67 Roderick Watt, ‘“Wanderer, kommst du nach Sparta”: History through Propaganda into 
Literary Commonplace,’ The Modern Language Review 80, no. 4 (1985): 871–883; Stefan 
Rebenich, ‘From Thermopylae to Stalingrad: The Myth of Leonidas in German Historiog-
raphy,’ in Sparta: Beyond the Mirage, ed. Stephen Hodkinson and Anton Powell (Swansea: 
Classical Press of Wales, 2002), 323–349; Anouschka Albertz, Exemplarisches Heldentum: 
Die Rezeptionsgeschichte der Schlacht an den Thermopylen von der Antike bis zur Gegen-
wart (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), 293–308; Helen Roche, ‘Wanderer, kommst du nach 
Sparta oder nach Stalingrad? Ancient Ideals of Self-sacrifice and German Military Propa-
ganda,’ in Making Sacrifices: Visions of Sacrifice in European and American Cultures, ed. 
Nicholas Brooks and Gregor Thuswaldner (Vienna: New Academic Press, 2016), 66–86.
68 Losemann, ‘Spartan Tradition,’ esp. pp. 278–279.
69 Picker, Tischgespräche, 101 (4 February 1942).
70 Losemann, ‘Spartan Tradition,’ 295.
71 Cf. Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action française, Italian Fascism, National Social-
ism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 523.
72 The quotation is taken from Suzanne L. Marchand, Down from Olympus: Archaeology and 
Philhellenism in Germany, 1750–1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 343.
73 Pace Chapoutot, who appears to subscribe to this view throughout.
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of necessity to be considered in something approaching its entirety – in history 
or classics lessons in schools, and in academia – or when the search was on for 
suitable historical examples of racial rise, decline and fall – then the whole of 
antiquity would be mined and presented in racialized terms.74 But when a spe-
cific model from antiquity was being sought for the society which the Third 
Reich desired to construct, then that model was taken neither from Germanic 
nor from Roman history, but from Greece. Perhaps most tellingly of all, it was 
the Spartan paradigm with which the future leaders of the Third Reich were 
inculcated so assiduously at their elite boarding-schools, the National Political 
Education Institutes (npea) and the Adolf-Hitler-Schools.75
4 German Philhellenism, Romanità, and the Discontents of National 
Identity
But should this seeming surfeit of Nazi philhellenism and phillaconism sur-
prise us any more than Mussolini’s lust to recreate the grandeur that was 
Rome? In what follows, I will argue that the German recourse to ancient Greece 
and the Italian recourse to ancient Rome performed a somewhat analogous 
function, in the context of a long period of fractured national identity preced-
ing a process of national unification which was often perceived, both by na-
tionalist contemporaries as well as by external observers, as ‘belated’ and 
problematic.76
74 Helen Roche, ‘Blüte und Zerfall: “Schematic Narrative Templates” of Decline and Fall in 
“völkisch” and National Socialist Racial Ideology,’ in The Persistence of Race: Change and 
Continuity in Germany from the Wilhelmine Empire to National Socialism, ed. Lara Day and 
Oliver Haag (Oxford: Berghahn, 2017), 65–86; Helen Roche, ‘Classics and Education in the 
Third Reich: Die Alten Sprachen and the Nazification of Latin- and Greek-teaching in Sec-
ondary Schools,’ in Brill’s Companion to the Classics, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, ed. 
Helen Roche and Kyriakos Demetriou (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 238–263.
75 Losemann, ‘Spartan Tradition,’ 280–281; Helen Roche, ‘Spartanische Pimpfe: The Impor-
tance of Sparta in the Educational Ideology of the Adolf Hitler Schools,’ in Sparta in Mod-
ern Thought: Politics, History and Culture, ed. Stephen Hodkinson and Ian Macgregor Mor-
ris (Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 2012), 315–342; Helen Roche, Sparta’s German 
Children: The Ideal of Ancient Sparta in the Royal Prussian Cadet-Corps, 1818–1920, and in 
National Socialist Elite Schools (the Napolas), 1933–1945 (Swansea, Classical Press of Wales, 
2013).
76 The literature on German national identity and its discontents is vast, and only a few 
pointers can be given here. John Breuilly, ed., The State of Germany: The National Idea in 
the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern Nation-State (London: Longman, 1992); 
Harold James, A German Identity: 1770 to the Present Day (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 
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Of course, neither the German pursuit of philhellenism nor the Italian rel-
ish for romanità went uncontested; still less were they unanimously approved – 
indeed, from the later nineteenth century, those Germanophiles were legion 
who would have preferred to forget the classical past altogether and to concen-
trate upon the Teutonic past alone, while anti-Romanism remained a long-
standing feature of Italian political discourse, both before and after the city 
was crowned the national capital.77
Nevertheless, the veneration of ancient Greece and Rome as a means of bol-
stering and potentially stabilizing national identity can clearly be discerned in 
both cases, even if the German variant seems more extreme, inasmuch as it 
attempted to elide ruptures not only across time but across space as well. Yet, 
as Brian Vick has noted, it is in some measure precisely this captivation ‘by 
and Stefan Berger, Germany: Inventing the Nation (London: Arnold, 2004), collectively 
provide a comprehensive overview of many of the issues at stake; see also the classic ar-
ticle by James J. Sheehan, ‘What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation 
in German History and Historiography,’ The Journal of Modern History 53, no. 1 (1981): 1–23. 
Brian Vick’s monograph Defining Germany: The 1848 Frankfurt Parliamentarians and Na-
tional Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) gives a clear account of 
the earlier part of the nineteenth century, while Pieter Judson’s essay, ‘Nationalism in the 
Era of the Nation State, 1870–1945,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History, ed. 
Helmut Walser Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 499–526, provides a lucid 
summary of the state of affairs after German unification (see also footnote 79 below). 
Regarding the even greater problems inherent in the construction of Italian national 
identity (not least due to the intense antagonism and mutual incomprehension between 
the ‘North’ and ‘South’), Christopher Duggan’s The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 
1796 (London: Penguin, 2008) provides an excellent overview; other synoptic works in-
clude Emilio Gentile, La Grande Italia: The Myth of the Nation in the Twentieth Century 
(Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press, 2009), and Adrian Lyttelton, ed., Liberal and 
Fascist Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). On national identity more specifi-
cally, see (for example) the edited volumes by Gino Bedani and Bruce Haddock, The Poli-
tics of Italian National Identity: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 2000); Ascoli and Henneberg, Making and Remaking Italy, and Silvana Patri-
arca and Lucy Riall, ed., The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-
Century Italy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); also Silvana Patriarca, Italian Vices: 
Nation and Character from the Risorgimento to the Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2010).
77 On anti-classicizing Germanophilia, see e.g. Marchand, Down from Olympus, ch. 5; on 
anti-Romanism, see e.g. Adrian Lyttelton, ‘Creating a National Past: History, Myth and 
Image in the Risorgimento,’ in Making and Remaking Italy: The Cultivation of National 
Identity around the Risorgimento, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Krystyna von Henneberg 
(Oxford: Berg, 2001), 27–74; Gentile, Fascismo di Pietra, 25–27; Arthurs, ‘The Eternal 
Parasite.’
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 images of both nationality and Greek antiquity’ which can usefully offer ‘a 
fresh perspective on certain problems of German national identity’.78 It is in 
this spirit that we shall proceed to investigate the relationship between Ger-
man philhellenism and nationhood, and between Italian nationhood and ro-
manità, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards.
The problems which beset the potential path to German unity were consid-
erable, despite the grand narrative of historical inevitability which nationalist 
historians such as Treitschke would have their readers believe – ranging from 
the utter lack of congruity between state borders and linguistic and cultural 
boundaries (and the attendant rift between großdeutsch and kleindeutsch vi-
sions of the German nation) to the later tensions inherent in integrating a 
populace which often bore far greater allegiance to ingrained local and region-
al loyalties than to the newly-formed nation state.79 Although the Holy Roman 
Empire might in some measure deserve the designation of a ‘weak German 
proto-state’, it was nevertheless (to quote Stefan Berger) ‘a motley collection of 
hundreds of largely autonomous dukedoms, principalities, free cities and cleri-
cal fiefdoms which lacked any strong central authority [and incorporated] 
many territories where the majority of people did not speak a German 
dialect.’80
In the absence of any firm geographical boundaries within which to encom-
pass a putative nation-state, the small minority of nationalist intellectuals who 
desired the unification of Germany in some form or another not only devel-
oped a highly cultural form of nationalism, but also engaged in what Harold 
78 Brian Vick, ‘Greek Origins and Organic Metaphors: Ideals of Cultural Autonomy in Neo-
humanist Germany from Winckelmann to Curtius,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 63, no. 3 
(2002): 483–500, here p. 483.
79 John Breuilly, ‘The National Idea in Modern German History’, in The State of Germany: The 
National Idea in the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern Nation-State, ed. John 
Breuilly (London: Longman, 1992), 1–28; also the literature listed in footnote 76 above. On 
the centrifugal effects and relative strength of regional identities even after unification, 
and the difficulties inherent in creating a viable kleindeutsch national identity, see the 
seminal studies by Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Meta-
phor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918 (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1997), and Abigail Green, Fatherlands: State-building and 
Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001); as well as Glenn Penny’s more recent observations on German ‘polycentrism’: e.g. 
H. Glenn Penny, ‘German Polycentrism and the Writing of History,’ German History 30, no. 
2 (2012): 265–282.
80 Berger, Germany, 1.
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James has termed ‘the promiscuous construction of a national image, a na-
tional identity, and a national mission. They went to classical antiquity as a 
guide; and they seized models and examples supplied by foreign countries’, 
using them as ‘building blocks’.81
One of the most seminal of these construction blocks was undoubtedly the 
turn towards Greek antiquity, initially presented as a paradigm which could 
satisfactorily trounce the Roman pretensions of the French and their Napole-
onic Empire, whilst at the same time endowing Germany with a superior sense 
of culture and a civilizing mission. In this fashion, Goethe’s exhortation to seek 
out the land of the Greeks with one’s soul might seem to be a perfectly legiti-
mate response to the nationalist poet Arndt’s despairing cry ‘What is the Ger-
man’s fatherland!?’ Just as Greece had held her uncouth conqueror captive 
with her cultural virtues, just so would Germany triumph over French tyranny 
and find her place upon the world stage. While ancient Rome was often con-
sidered too French, too Popish, and too universalist to hold true sway over the 
German imagination, and while the Germanic past might still seem unpromis-
ingly unrefined to any but the most enthusiastic adherents of völkisch nation-
alism, for many Germans (especially among the middle and upper classes), 
emulating Greece genuinely did seem the most effective route to cultural, ar-
tistic, and ultimately national greatness, as Winckelmann had once pro-
claimed.82 This held true just as much in Prussia, the haunt of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, doyen of humanism, as it did in Bavaria, the home of Hellenophile 
King Ludwig I and his son Otto, the first ever King of Greece.83
Even after unification, national prestige projects such as the large-scale ar-
chaeological excavations which took place in Greece and Asia Minor towards 
the end of the century were largely framed in philhellenist terms.84 Despite the 
growing popularity of more essentialist notions of what ‘being German’ might 
consist of, and an increasingly virulent campaign against the monopoly of hu-
manistic Bildung (with which Kaiser Wilhelm ii clearly sympathized when he 
accused the Gymnasium system of turning out ‘young Greeks and Romans’ 
rather than ‘nationally-minded young Germans’),85 movements such as the 
81 James, A German Identity, 6–8.
82 Glenn W. Most, ‘On the Use and Abuse of Ancient Greece for Life,’ Cultura Tedesca 20 
(2002): 31–53; Marchand, Down from Olympus, 159–160; James, A German Identity, 19–21, 
44–49.
83 James, A German Identity, 44–46.
84 Marchand, Down from Olympus, ch. 3.
85 Wilhelm ii, ‘Eröffnungsansprache zur Schulkonferenz 1890,’ in Quellen zur deutschen 
Schulgeschichte seit 1800, ed. Gerhardt Giese (Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1961), 
196–197.
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Lebensreformbewegung, the Jugendbewegung, and even the nudist Freikör-
perkultur, were keen to bolster their neo-Greek and neo-Spartan credentials, 
sometimes even affirming themselves publicly as ‘Deutsch-Hellenes’.86 Phil-
hellenism might have been only one of the many models available to Germany 
in terms of creating a serviceable national identity, but the idea of the exis-
tence of a mythic Greco-German elective affinity or Wesensverwandtschaft ran 
deep, and possessed an extraordinarily broad appeal, not least because it had 
been extolled by so many of the towering intellectual figures of the past 
 century-and-a-half, from Winckelmann to Schiller and Herder, and from 
Goethe to Wagner and Nietzsche.87
Moreover, the paradigm was an extremely malleable one, encompassing not 
only the glories of Greek art or the freedoms of Athenian democracy, but also 
the martial prowess and strict discipline of the Spartan state – a model which 
had always been particularly favoured by the Prussian military establish-
ment.88 And, as racial theories began to proliferate from the fin de siècle on-
wards, it did not take too much imagination to reconstitute the ‘elective kin-
ship’ as a literal kinship, justified by anthropological theories of mass migration 
which postulated that the Dorian race had originated in deepest darkest 
Thuringia (or thereabouts).89 The Nazified forms of philhellenism sketched 
above had certainly not sprung fully formed from Hitler’s fancy, like Athena 
from the head of Zeus. Rather, their gestation had been long, arduous, and in-
fluential, and although the existence of such ideas could never be said to have 
predestined or predetermined the use which National Socialism made of 
them, it was unlikely that the regime would ever have seen fit to ignore 
them  entirely, given the enormous cultural capital which they had accrued 
hitherto.
During the course of the long nineteenth century, Italy also faced a not dis-
similar (though arguably rather harder) struggle to forge a culturally-mediated 
national identity from an astonishingly disparate array of linguistically, cultur-
ally, and infrastructurally divergent states and kingdoms, in the face of 
86 Sünderhauf, Griechensehnsucht, ch. iii; Losemann, ‘Spartan Tradition,’ 259–273.
87 Cf. the classic studies by Eliza Marian Butler, The Tyranny of Greece over Germany (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935); Walther Rehm, Griechentum und Goethezeit: 
Geschichte eines Glaubens (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1936); also Marchand, Down from Olympus, 
ch. 1.
88 Helen Roche, ‘“Go, tell the Prussians…”: The Spartan Paradigm in Prussian Military 
Thought during the Long Nineteenth Century,’ New Voices in Classical Reception Studies 7 
(2012): 25–39.
89 Cf. Fleming, ‘Fascism,’ 348.
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 seemingly intractable practical and political problems.90 Not only was the vast 
majority of the population indifferent to any loyalty beyond the local munici-
palism of the ‘piccola patria’ – to the extent that onlookers in Naples or Sicily 
regarding the cheering crowds hailing Italian unification in 1860 could ask be-
musedly and without the slightest irony, ‘What is Italy?’ or even jump to the 
erroneous conclusion that ‘La Talia’ must be the King’s wife.91 Rather, the patri-
otic intellectuals who had conjured up and ultimately realized the idea of a 
united Italian nation also had to contend with the enmity of the immensely 
influential – and still temporally powerful – Roman Catholic Church, whose 
virulent opposition to the unified Italian state was so great that the Vatican did 
not even acknowledge its existence officially until 1929.92 Perhaps most dis-
turbingly of all, the gulf which existed between the wealthy, rapidly industrial-
izing North and the desperately poverty-stricken, brigand-haunted agrarian 
South was so great that (predominantly Northern) politicians would frequent-
ly liken the Mezzogiorno to some hideous disease or disfigurement, and com-
pare its lack of civilization unfavourably with that of barbarian Africa (some-
times even inflicting violence of quasi-colonialist brutality on its unruly and 
immiserated inhabitants).93
Thus, the burning question ‘Where then is Italy? What does it consist of?’ 
was as pressing for Giuseppe Ferrari and his compatriots in 1848 as it had been 
for Arndt’s non-existent ‘Germany’ in 1813, yet the problem of ‘multiple Italies’ 
was by no means resolved even once the state had finally been unified over a 
decade later (albeit due more to coincidence and external intervention than 
the exercise of ‘the Italian will’).94 Italy might have been made – but how was 
one satisfactorily to ‘make’ the Italians?95
90 For an interesting comparison of the Italian and German paths to unification, see Oliver 
Janz and Hannes Siegrist, ‘Zentralismus und Föderalismus- Strukturen und Kulturen im 
deutsch-italienischen Vergleich: Einleitende Bemerkungen,’ in Zentralismus und Föderal-
ismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Deutschland und Italien im Vergleich (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2000), 9–17.
91 Lyttelton, ‘Creating a National Past,’ 27; Duggan, Force of Destiny, 211.
92 Alice A. Kelikian, ‘The Church and Catholicism,’ in Liberal and Fascist Italy, ed. Adrian 
Lyttelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 44–61.
93 Nelson Moe, The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the Southern Question (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002); Duggan, Force of Destiny, 226–228.
94 Duggan, Force of Destiny, esp. page 91; Gentile, La Grande Italia; Krystyna Henneberg and 
Albert Russell Ascoli, ‘Introduction: Nationalism and the Uses of Risorgimento Culture,’ 
in Making and Remaking Italy: The Cultivation of National Identity around the Risorgimen-
to, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Krystyna von Henneberg (Oxford: Berg, 2001), 1–23.
95 Cf. Bedani and Haddock, Italian National Identity, 3; Gentile, La Grande Italia, 36.
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To many of Italy’s leading political figures, the legacy of Rome seemed to 
provide a crucial piece in the puzzle of how to reform a reluctant and nation-
ally apathetic populace into a united nation of patriots. Even prior to unifica-
tion, many of the key architects of the Risorgimento, such as Gioberti,  Garibaldi, 
and Mazzini, had carried a torch for past Roman glories. Each believed in the 
symbolic potency of ancient Rome, not least because the last time that the Ital-
ian peninsula had been united had been under the Roman Empire, some 1,400 
years earlier.96 While Garibaldi was particularly taken with the idea of dicta-
torship (in its original Roman sense), Mazzini dreamed of a future ‘Third 
Rome’; he famously proclaimed that: ‘after the Rome of the Caesars, after the 
Rome of the Popes, there will come the Rome of the people’.97 Count Cavour, 
somewhat more prosaically, also saw Rome as the best choice for the contested 
national capital, for it was the only city which possessed a memory greater 
than the merely municipal.98 Meanwhile, it was Francesco Crispi, the self-
styled ‘Italian Bismarck’, who first used the Roman Empire as a model for Italy’s 
ill-fated attempts to cut herself a slice of the colonial pie – resurrecting the 
idea of ‘mare nostrum’ decades before Mussolini, and claiming that the great-
ness of Rome would always demand that Italy possess a proper empire rather 
than a little kingdom.99
The House of Savoy also perceived the myth of Rome as a useful tool for 
furnishing the young kingdom (and its somewhat controversial Piedmontese 
ruling dynasty) with a prestigious past – hence such Romanizing monuments 
as the Vittoriano, or the official archaeological excavations and exhibitions 
which were devised in the service of romanità during the early years of the 
twentieth century.100 While the fasces and the Roman she-wolf had been fa-
miliar iconographically at least since the Risorgimento, the idea that classical 
history could form a seamless conjunction with Italian national history was 
imbibed enthusiastically by a whole generation of scholars and intellectuals, 
many of whom would later see no incongruity in furthering the Fascist ‘cult of 
romanità’ along similar lines.101
96 Cf. Philippe Foro, ‘Romaniser la Nation et nationaliser la romanité: l’exemple de l’Italie,’ 
Anabases: Traditions et réceptions de l’Antiquité 1 (2005): 105–117; Duggan, Force of Destiny, 
128, 130, 156.
97 Duggan, Force of Destiny, 128, 177; Giardina, Il mito di Roma, 169–172.
98 Giardina, Il mito di Roma, 186–187; Gentile, La Grande Italia, 42ff.
99 Giardina, Il mito di Roma, 196; Duggan, Force of Destiny, 381; Gentile, La Grande Italia, ch. 
6, 66.
100 Foro, ‘Romaniser la Nation,’ 106–107; Gentile, La Grande Italia, ch. 3.
101 Lazzaro, ‘Forging a Visible Fascist Nation,’ 16; Visser, ‘Fascist Doctrine,’ 7–8. In this context, 
Emilio Gentile has argued that Mazzini sought to establish a new ‘political religion’ 
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Thus, the necessity of both living up to and, in some sense, recreating the 
ancient Roman past gradually became part and parcel of the educated Italian’s 
mental furniture, and the disappointments and failures of the Italian parlia-
mentary state in the decades prior to the First World War merely led national-
ist activists such as Gabriele D’Annunzio to bemoan the extent to which the 
ancient ideal of Rome had been betrayed.102 If Mussolini could overcome the 
‘missed opportunities’ of the Risorgimento and resurrect Rome more truly, 
then, in the view of many observers, that was surely a development to be wel-
comed.103 From this perspective, the equation of ancient Rome with Italian 
national redemption possessed just as venerable a history as that of German 
philhellenism, and one which, without causing any unconscionable ruptures 
with the recent past, Fascism could just as easily exploit to the full.104
5 Conclusion
As this brief sketch has demonstrated, there are undoubtedly salient differ-
ences as well as significant parallels between the ways in which these two clas-
sical models were deployed. For instance, the ‘cult of romanità’ appears (at 
least at first glance) to have been imposed in a more top-down fashion by the 
ruling classes, whereas philhellenism seemed to encompass a broader church – 
perhaps in part because ‘ancient Greece’ itself was such a multifarious histori-
cal phenomenon, providing a more varied selection of polities and mores 
which could cater to all tastes, from the aspiring Social Democrat to the Pla-
tonic pederast to the laconophile Prussian general.
Nevertheless, I hope to have shown that considering these two classicizing 
phenomena side by side can prove illuminating from a number of perspec-
tives. Firstly, it seems obvious that we do indeed need to treat the antique 
 pretensions of both Mussolini’s ‘Third Rome’ and Hitler’s Third Reich with 
a  suitable degree of seriousness, acknowledging their not insubstantial 
 centred around Rome, which later found its most virulent expression under Fascism; cf. 
Emilio Gentile, Il culto del littorio: La sacralizzazione della politica nell’Italia fascista (Bari: 
Laterza, 1993).
102 Duggan, Force of Destiny, 177, 351–352, 375.
103 Visser, ‘Fascist Doctrine,’ 8–10; Foro, ‘Romaniser la Nation,’ 113–116.
104 While the Nazi and Fascist regimes’ take on ancient Greece and Rome usually boasted a 
strongly and (more or less) officially propagandistic element, which, in the case of the 
Third Reich, was particularly overlaid with the rhetoric of race, there still exist clearly 
discernible continuities with the discourses employed in pre-Fascist romanità and phil-
hellenism respectively.
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 intellectual pedigree, and siting them within a far broader timeframe than has 
often been considered,105 rather than ascribing them merely to the national 
trauma experienced in the aftermath of World War I (as Johann Chapoutot has 
most insistently proposed in the German case).106
Relatedly, it seems necessary to acknowledge that, in both instances, this 
turn to antiquity never merely represented a stock manifestation of the fascist 
response to modernity by glorifying any old mythic past, but rather represent-
ed the nationally-specific, fascistizing incarnation of a pre-existing claim to 
classicizing national identity, constructed in the absence of a more satisfactory 
national past, due to the discontents of fractured statehood and late unifica-
tion in both the German and the Italian case. Thus, we should consider this 
phenomenon to be neither wholly reactionary nor wholly modern – and cer-
tainly not wholly fascist. Yet, at the same time, the recourse to ‘distant models’ 
which had long held such high prestige value throughout the Western world 
was arguably based upon a desire to attain to an authority which extended 
beyond mere nationalist particularism.
Of course, Greece and Rome never constituted the sole content of the Nazi 
and Fascist historic imaginaries. However, we might at the very least suggest 
that they formed dominant themes in the symphony of Fascist and National 
Socialist historical resonances. Moreover, as Andrea Giardina has noted, the 
twin models of Sparta and Rome have more in common than one might ini-
tially suppose – both glorifying an antidemocratic paradigm of antiquity which 
was fundamentally opposed to the Athenian exemplar, and both privileging 
similarly bellicose virtues – all of which could chime very naturally with fascist 
sensibilities.107
Finally, we might close by suggesting that, in both the Italian and the Ger-
man case, the turn to Rome and Greece aimed to create an ‘alternative moder-
nity’ which was fundamentally futural.108 Ultimately, rather than representing 
some form of ‘reactionary modernism’, Fascist and Nazi classicizing chronop-
olitics transfigured the humanistic cultural tropes of the past into a new form 
of ‘classicizing modernism’ which was Janus-faced, utilizing the familiar power 
of the Greek or Roman exemplum to fuel an extraordinary leap into the 
 confidently-imagined fascist future.
105 See Fleming, ‘Fascism,’ for endorsement of such an approach.
106 Cf. Chapoutot, Greeks, Romans, Germans, esp. p. 5.
107 Cf. Giardina, Il mito di Roma, 124.
108 cf. Griffin, Modernism and Fascism, 31, 222–223, 244; David D. Roberts, ‘Myth, Style, Sub-
stance and the Totalitarian Dynamic in Fascist Italy’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 
16, No. 1 (2007), 1–36, esp. p. 22.
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